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QUALIFICATION: A CALL FOR AN EXTENSION OF
PRIOR INTENT
INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1977, the new California General Corpora-
tion Law became effective.' Scattered throughout this legisla-
tion are provisions designed to guarantee judicial recognition
of shareholder agreements in close corporations, even if
such agreements fail to distinguish between the powers and
duties of shareholders and directors, thus violating the tradi-
tional corporate norm.2 Most commentators have viewed this
statutory scheme as a laudatory approach to the problems as-
sociated with shareholder agreements in the close corporate
situation. 3 However, the current state securities qualification
laws limit the availability of this guarantee by forcing close
corporations to qualify stock issuances.'
Specifically, section 260.102.4(b) of Title 10 of the Califor-
nia Administrative Code provides that a corporation does not
have one class of stock if there exists, or is intended to be
executed, a shareholders' agreement which affects the rights,
preferences, privileges, or restrictions of or on a corporation's
stock in a manner not applicable to all outstanding shares.5
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1. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 100-2300 (West 1977).
2. The legislative committee comment that follows CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (West
1977) states:
Under prior law the operation of a close corporation is unnecessarily
hindered by the failure of corporation statutes to recognize the unique
attributes of these corporations ...
The intent of the close corporation provisions in the new law is to
statutorily recognize the unique characteristics of such corporate entities
and permit tailoring of the traditional corporate norm to the needs of
these closely held enterprises.
See text accompanying notes 47-57 infra.
3. See, e.g., Berger, California's New General Corporation Law: Close and
Closely-Held Corporations, 7 PAc. L.J. 585, 586 (1976) [hereinafter. cited as Berger;
Bradley, A Comparative Assessment of the California Close Corporations Provisions
and a Proposal for Protecting Individual Participants, 9 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 865, 867,
871 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bradley]; Jordan, The Close-Corporation Provisions
of the New California General Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1094, 1114 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Jordan]; O'Neal & Magill, California's New Close Corporation
Legislation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1976).
4. Under CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25110, 25120, 25130 (West 1977), it is unlawful for
any corporation to offer or sell any security unless such sale or issuance has been
qualified or exempted from qualification. For a discussion of state securities qualifica-
tion procedures, see notes 66-85 and accompanying text infra.
5. This regulation was adopted pursuant to CAL. CORP. CODE § 25610 (West
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Since almost all significant shareholder agreements affect the
rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions usually associated
with the ownership of stock, this regulation effectively elimi-
nates the small offering exemption to the requirements of Cor-
porations Code section 25110.6 In addition, Corporations Code
section 25120 requires that securities of an existing corporation
be qualified in the event of a conversion to close corporate
status if a shareholders' agreement exists which materially and
adversely affects any class of shareholders, even though section
24103(e) has been amended to exclude corporate conversions to
close corporate status.7
This comment will review the present law regarding share-
holder agreements and security qualification procedures. These
statutes and administrative regulations will then be examined
in the context of typical close corporation situations. Addition-
ally, the comment will demonstrate that these qualification
requirements subject the majority of close corporate stock issu-
ances to the unnecessary burdens associated with the qualifica-
tion process, thereby reducing the desirability of incorporating
under the close corporation statutes.
THE CALIFORNIA CLOSE CORPORATION: AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE
TRADITIONAL CORPORATE NORM
In California a close corporation is defined as a corporation
whose articles contain both a provision limiting the number of
1977), which grants the Corporations Commissioner power to make rules and regula-
tions that he feels are necessary to carry out the provisions of the Corporate Securities
Law of 1968 (CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West 1977)) and became effective on
June 15, 1978.
6. Under CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h) (West 1977), corporations are exempted
from the provisions of CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (West 1977) if: (a) after the completion
of the transaction there will be only one class of voting common stock outstanding and
there will be no more than ten beneficial owners of such stock; (b) a legend is placed
upon each certificate which restricts the transfer of such stock; (c) no advertisements
have been used to promote the sale of the offer; (d) no selling expenses have been paid
in connection with the offer of the shares; (e) the consideration paid for the stocks
meets the requirements of subdivision (3); (f) no promotional consideration has been
paid in connection with the founding and organization of the corporation; and (g) a
form of notice, signed by an active member of the State Bar, is sent to the Office of
the Commissioner no later than ten days after receiving the consideration for the
stocks. See Arhelger, The Close Corporation Exemption, 48 L.A. B. BULL. 55, 55-61
(1972); Ziskin, California's Expanded Close-Corporation Exemption and the Lawyer's
Role Thereunder, 49 CAL. ST. B. J. 248, 249 n.5 (1974). The provisions of CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25120 (West 1977) can be waived by the Commissioner in any instance where
it is determined that qualification is not necessary to protect investors or the public
in general. CA.. CORP. CODE § 25105 (West 1977).
7. See 1978 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 370, at 1041.
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record shareholders to a specific number not to exceed ten, and
a statement which says "[tihis corporation is a close corpora-
tion." In addition, California Corporations Code section 202
requires that the word "corporation" be contained in the name
of the business. An existing corporation may convert itself into
a close corporation by including these provisions in its articles.
The effectiveness of such an amendment is conditioned upon
the approval of all outstanding shares regardless of class or
limitations on voting rights.'0
Traditional corporate theory views shareholders and direc-
tors as two separate and distinct groups, each having exclusive
rights and duties. Under this concept, authority to direct the
general policy of the corporation is extended solely to the board
of directors." Shareholders are, therefore, specifically denied
such power and are seen merely as the owners of the enter-
prise." However, as the owners of the corporation, shareholders
are granted the power to control the membership of the board
and action involving extraordinary corporate matters."
8. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (West 1977). The number of actual record holders may
exceed ten under the counting rules of that section. It is provided that a husband and
wife and the personal representative of either of them are counted as one regardless of
how the shares are held between them. A trust or personal representative of a decedent
holding shares will also be counted as one regardless of the number of beneficiaries or
trustees. Further, a partnership or corporation holding shares is counted as one. Id. §
158(d); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.102.5 (1977); see Arhelger, The Close Corpora-
tion Exemption, 48 L.A. B. Buu.. 55, 56 (1972); Jordan, supra note 3, at 1097.
9. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(b) (West 1977).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., H. HENN, THE LAW OF CORPOa.TIONS 361-62 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as HENN]; I H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
LAW § 24.05[51 (R. Clark ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE & STERLING].
Even though this concept has been accepted as the legal model, it is clear that
day-to-day working practice does not conform to this norm. The reality is that directors
often serve merely as "rubber stamps" for decisions that are typically made by top
executives. M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 47, 48, 68, 185 (1971); Eisenberg,
Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Direc-
tors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 375, 376-84 (1975).
12. See, e.g., HENN, supra note 11, at 361-62; Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of
Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L.
REv. 1, 4-6 (1969); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 250-51 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Hetherington].
13. Modern commentators have noted that in publicly-held corporations the
distribution of equity securities among vast numbers of people has created shareholder
apathy with respect to board elections. Board members are, therefore, quite capable
of perpetuating themselves as directors with only occasional difficulty. Hetherington,
supra note 12, at 252-54.
Shareholders are also given exclusive rights to control management decisions re-
specting such actions as the amendment of articles, mergers, consolidations, shares
affecting substantially all of the corporation's assets, and voluntary dissolution. How-
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In the close corporation setting, however, this division of
power is not always observed. Instead, the shareholders of a
close corporation are generally both the investors of capital and
the managers. In such a situation, it is not surprising to find
that the shareholders want not only a direct voice in day-to-day
management, but assurance that important decisions will be
within their control. In fact, the shareholders often view them-
selves as partners, frequently failing to distinguish between
voting power at the shareholder level and voting power at the
directorship level.'4
Shareholder agreements are typically used in close corpo-
rations as a means of assuring shareholders this degree of con-
trol by granting them a direct voice in ordinary decision-
making. 5 These agreements specifying rights and duties can
extend to a broad range of activities. The most important areas
covered are those relating to the manner of electing officers and
directors, the allocation of decision-making authority to speci-
fied individuals, the creation of a veto power over certain cor-
porate actions in one or more of the participants, and the allo-
cation of dividends.5
Vesting control over certain corporate decisions in a speci-
fied shareholder, or group of shareholders, can cause problems.
Of these problems, deadlock is potentially the most serious
because it can lead to paralysis of the corporate decision-
making process. Thus, it is important for shareholders to pro-
vide methods of resolving issues requiring action in the event
of such a crisis. One such method is the use of a binding arbi-
trator whereby the shareholders can agree that, in the case of
a deadlock, the decision of some neutral third party will con-
ever, since shareholder apathy extends to this area as well, it is most likely that such
decisions are also controlled by the board in most instances. HENN, supra note 11, at
361-62, 381; Hetherington, supra note 12, at 251 n.10.
14. See, e.g., HENN, supra note 11, at 507; 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1.07 (2nd ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEALI; Berger, supra note
3, at 590, 591 n.30.
15. O'Neal & Jarke, Control Arrangements in Close Corporations, 20 PRAC. LAW.
27, 34 (1974).
16. See BAI.LANTINE & STERLING, supra note 11, at § 60.02[21b][iI; D. NEWELL
& D. WRIGHT, ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 84-85 (Nov. 1977 Supp.); Ber-
ger, supra note 3, at 602; Ghinger, Shareholders'Agreements for Closely Held Corpora-
tions: Special Tools for Special Circumstances, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 211, 212 (1975).
Of course, it is possible to vest rights related to corporate decision-making in
shareholders by means other than shareholder agreements. Typically these devices
involve clauses in the corporation's articles requiring supermajority votes with respect
to specified matters, or the issuing of equity securities that have differing voting rights.
See, e.g., O'Neal & Janke, supra note 15, at 27-34.
[Vol. 19
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trol. 7 This eliminates the sole disadvantage arising from share-
holder agreements, and allows the shareholders to protect their
investment through the use of partnership-type practices while




Since traditional theory distinguishes between the powers
of shareholders and directors by making exclusive grants of
rights to each group, the use of shareholder agreements which
effectively disregard this distinction was frowned on by the
courts. In fact, in actions seeking the enforcement of share-
holder agreements, the courts usually disregarded the agree-
ment entirely. However, the courts distinguished between
agreements that controlled the actions of shareholders as
shareholders, and those that controlled their actions as direc-
tors.' When the agreement involved control of shareholder ac-
17. Under CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1281-1288.8 (West 1972), any controversy can
be submitted to arbitration, provided that the parties have the foresight to agree in
writing to submit to the arbitration process before the problem arises. If the parties
have so planned, the dispute may be submitted for resolution to the arbitrator who
then makes a decision effectively settling the issue.
Many practitioners are convinced that the arbitration process simply cannot
maintain intimate relationships necessary for the effective management of close-
corporations. However, the fact is that the use of arbitration clauses is growing due to
their satisfactory performance. As a result, the use of binding arbitration should be
seriously considered in any case where there exists the potential of deadlock. See, e.g.,
2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9.08-9.25 (2d ed. 1971); Horn-
stein, Arbitration in Incorporated Partnerships, 108 ARa. J. 229, 231 (1963); Note,
Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L. REV.
271, 279-80 (1970).
18. The doctrine of limited shareholder liability has not always been recognized
as a corporate attribute. Indeed, California held shareholders subject to unlimited
liability on a proportionate basis until 1928. HENN, supra note 11, at 96 n.4, 110 n.2.
19. Corporate income is usually subjected to double taxation; once when the
'corporation realizes earnings, I.R.C. § 61(a)(2), and again at the shareholder level
where corporate dividends are also taxed, I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
While this may not appear to be much of an advantage, it should be noted that
in certain situations corporate taxation may actually increase net in-pocket income
since retained earnings of the corporation are not subject to taxation even though they
increase the business owners' net worth. Z. CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 1.011l][b] (1978). Furthermore, if this tax schedule is not ad-
vantageous, incorporation may still put more actual money into the hands of the
business owner if the Subsection S election is available since, for all practical purposes,
double taxation is eliminated under that provision. Id. § 3.01. For a complete discus-
sion of the tax aspects of incorporating as a close-corporation, see T. NESS & E. VOGEL,
TAXATION OF THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION (1967).
20. Jordan, supra note 3, at 1112.
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tion courts generally invalidated the agreement on the theory
that shareholders owed a duty to the corporation to exercise
their discretion freely. In addition, such an agreement sepa-
rated voting power from ownership by delegating voting rights
to a specific individual or group."'
In a frequently cited case, Harvey v. Linville Improvement
Co.,2" the Supreme Court of North Carolina invalidated a
shareholders' agreement that required the participants to pool
their stock, transfer it to trustees, and authorize the trustees
to vote all such stock at corporate meetings as they saw fit. The
court stated that it was against public policy to permit
large blocks of stock to be irrevocably tied up for the pur-
pose of being voted in solido, for the interest of a clique or
section of the stockholders, and not according to the judge-
ment of each stockholder, for the benefit of the entire cor-
poration. . . . The power to vote is inherently connected
to and inseparable from the real ownership of each share,
and can only be delegated by proxy with power of revoca-
tion.':'
The more modern cases have rejected this viewpoint." In-
stead, courts now refuse to invalidate these types of agreements
per se and focus on the purpose of the agreement. If the court
determines that the purpose is not violative of public policy,
the agreement will be enforced. This trend has become so wide-
spread that today the validity of a shareholders' agreement
that controls the actions of the shareholders as shareholders
can be assumed."
Case law involving shareholder agreements which con-
trolled the discretion of directors developed in the same pat-
tern, even though courts were careful to distinguish these
agreements from those that controlled shareholder discretion.
21. HENN, supra note 11, at 528; O'NEAL, supra note 14, at § 5.04.
22. 118 N.C. 448, 24 S.E. 489 (1896).
23. Id. at 453, 24 S.E. at 490.
24. See, e.g., Weil v. Beresth, 154 Conn. 12, 16, 220 A.2d 456,459 (1966); Tschirgi
v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 253 Iowa 682, 688-89, 113 N.W.2d 226, 231-32 (1962); Royster
v. Baker, 365 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Mo. 1963); Schubin v. Surchin, 27 App. Div. 2d 452,
455, 280 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (1967); Blount v. Taft, 29 N.C. App. 626, 630, 225 S.E.2d 583,
586 (1976); Irwin v. Prestressed Structures, Inc., 420 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Ct. App.
1967).
25. HENN, supra note 11, at 527-28; O'NEAL, supra note 14, at § 5.04. O'Neal does
add, however, that the idea that shareholders have a duty to exercise independent
judgment is not dead, as he suggests that a shareholders' agreement might be invalida-
ted depending on the purpose of the agreement and the relevant statutes in effect
within the particular jurisdiction. O'NEAL, supra note 14, at §§ 5.04, 5.06, 5.07.
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The traditional view saw the corporate and partnership forms
of business organization as mutually exclusive. Thus, courts
refused to allow businessmen to operate under the corporate
form while reverting to partnership practices when those prac-
tices proved to be more convenient." One of the most famous
examples of that view was Manson v. Curtis,27 a New York case
in which the directors, as owners of a majority of a corpora-
tion's stock, agreed that the general manager was to be allowed
to shape the policy of the corporation." The court invalidated
the agreement, holding that depriving the directors of their
statutory duty to manage the corporation violated public pol-
icy 29
Application of the traditional view was then rejected in a
landmark case, Clark v. Dodge,3° where a New York court was
willing to validate a shareholders' agreement because the par-
ticipants owned all of the corporation's stock, and because the
agreement was drafted in such a way that it was unlikely to
harm creditors.3' A general rule emerged from that case allow-
ing shareholder agreements that control director discretion,
but only where all of the corporation's shareholders partici-
pated in an agreement that posed no threat to outside credi-
tors.3
2
The courts in California have also endeavored to follow the
distinction between shareholder agreements that control share-
holder action and those that control director action. Those
agreements controlling the participants' action as shareholders
have been unquestioned in the absence of a statutory prohibi-
tion .3 3 For example, in Smith v. San Francisco & Northern
Pacific Railroad,34 the court validated a shareholders' agree-
ment requiring the participants to vote as a unit in the
election of directors. The court rejected the defendants' conten-
tion that the agreement violated public policy, criticizing that
26. O'NEAL, supra note 14, at § 5.04.
27. 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
28. Id. at 316-17, 119 N.E. at 560.
29. Id. at 322-25, 119 N.E. at 562.
30. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
31. Id. at 445, 199 N.E. at 642.
32. See HENN, supra note 11, at 532; O'NEAL, supra note 14, at § 5.08; Comment,
"Shareholders' Agreements" and the Statutory Norm, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 68, 74-77
(1957).
33. See Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. R.R., 115 Cal. 584, 600-01, 47 P.
582, 588-89 (1897); Dougherty v. Cross, 65 Cal. App. 2d 687, 702, 151 P.2d 654, 662
(1944); Simpson v. Nelson, 77 Cal. App. 297, 300, 246 P. 342, 343 (1926) (agreement
invalidated on other grounds); Wang, Pooling Agreements Under the New California
General Corporations Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1171, 1174 (1976).
34. 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
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argument as a vague rubric which would allow courts to decide
questions upon the basis of individual preference rather than
upon hard rules of law. 5 The court stated:
It is not in violation of any rule or principle of law for
stockholders, who own a majority of the stock in a corpora-
tion, to cause its affairs to be managed in such a way as
they may think best calculated to further the ends of the
corporation, and, for this purpose, to appoint one or more
proxies who shall vote in such a way as will carry out their
plan."
The California decisions have not been so uniform with
respect to shareholders' agreements that control the actions of
shareholders as directors. The majority of cases have held that
such agreements are valid, at least where substantially all of
the shareholders are involved,37 or where the interests of others
are not affected.1 However, some decisions did not follow the
majority, and a conflict developed among the appellate dis-
tricts.39 In fact two courts expressly invalidated shareholder
agreements because of their infringement on the traditional
corporate norm.40 Adopting this view, the court in Kennerson
v. Burbank Amusement Co.4 stated: "Inasmuch as the direc-
tors must exercise and maintain control over corporate affairs
in good faith, they are prohibited from delegating such control
and management to others, and any contract so providing is
void.""
The cases illustrate that there was some confusion as to
the state of the law with respect to the validity of shareholders'
agreements. At least two courts had expressly invalidated
shareholder agreements, while others enforced them. Some of
the courts that validated the shareholders' agreements empha-
35. Id. at 600, 47 P. at 587-88.
36. Id. at 600-01, 47 P. at 588.
37. See Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 111, 202
P.2d 748, 751 (1948); Hyman v. Karl Stern Co., 47 Cal. App. 605, 606-07, 191 P. 47,
47-48 (1926).
38. See Conover v. Smith, 83 Cal. App. 227, 231, 256 P. 835, 836 (1927).
39. Compare Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 202
P.2d 748 (1948); Conover v. Smith, 83 Cal. App. 227, 256 P. 835 (1927) and Hyman
v. Karl Stem Co., 47 Cal. App. 605, 191 P. 47 (1926) with Kennerson v. Burbank
Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953) and Smith v. California
Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 18 P.2d 393 (1933).
40. Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 172, 260 P.2d
823, 832 (1953); Smith v. California Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 101, 18 P.2d
393, 396 (1933).
41. 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953).
42. Id. at 172-73, 260 P.2d at 832.
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sized that they would place substance over form, noting that
the participants had actually intended to act as partners
thereby indicating that they would disregard the corporate en-
tity in an appropriate case.43 As such, it became clear that if
corporate planners were to be assured of the enforceability of
management controls and the viability of the corporate status,
they would have to have the express protection of statutory
language."
California's Response-The General Corporation Law
Most commentators agree that the new corporation law
was drafted, in part, to clarify the status of shareholder agree-
ments.4" One commentator stated that the new law explicitly
"provides a statutory basis for the drafting of shareholders'
agreements through which shareholders of a qualified close cor-
poration can be assured control of the enterprise similar to that
exercised in a partnership."
The General Corporation Law contains several provisions
pertaining t6 the validity of shareholder agreements in the
close corporation setting. The most significant provisions are
contained in Corporations Code sections 186, 300(b), and
706(a). The first of these, section 186, defines a shareholders'
agreement as a written agreement among all the shareholders
of a close corporation. Section 300(b) provides that any share-
holders' agreement that relates to any phase of the affairs of a
qualified close corporation is valid. This is limited by section
300(c), which provides that a shareholders' agreement may not
alter or waive statutory provisions concerning restrictions on
distributions to shareholders,47 involuntary dissolution pro-
ceedings,"6 corporate records and reports 9 or thb rights to in-
spect them,a crimes and penalties,5' filings required by the
43. For example, in Hyman v. Karl Stem Co., 47 Cal. App. 605, 607, 191 P. 47,
47-48 (1926), the court stated: "The association of the two individuals constituted
practically a partnership, the corporate organization being a mere agency to be used
in conducting the business." See also Conover v. Smith, 83 Cal. App. 227, 231, 256 P.
835, 836 (1927), where the court noted that: "The corporation, under our system,
following such an [shareholders'] agreement would be the mere agency of the asso-
ciates created for the sake of convenience in carrying out the agreement as between
those who made the bargain."
44. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 1114; Bradley, supra note 3, at 871.
45. Bradley, supra note 3, at 871.
46. Jordan, supra note 3, at 1114.
47. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 500, 501 (West 1977).
48. Id. §§ 1800-1809.
49. Id. §§ 1500-1508.
50. Id. §§ 1600-1605.
51. Id. §§ 2200-2260.
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Secretary of State,"2 the definition of close corporation,53 and
specified voting requirements related to mergers5 and reorgani-
zations." Section 706(a) expressly validates shareholder agree-
ments that control how shareholders vote their shares.
Section 706(a) has been written so that it applies very broadly.
Indeed, the only limit on the section's applicability is the fact
that it applies specifically to close corporations.
Both validating sections contain provisions stating: "An
agreement made pursuant to this subdivision shall terminate
when the corporation ceases to be a close corporation, except
that if the agreement so provides it shall continue to the extent
it is enforceable apart from this subdivision."57 When a close
corporation loses its close corporation status, it would seem
that a shareholders' agreement could effectively continue only
if the contingency were anticipated and provided for by the
participants. Thus, the new statute appears to be more restric-
tive, as the majority view of previous case law held that agree-
ments were to be validated regardless of the setting in which
they were made.58
These statutes do not control in the case of a non-close
corporation. The validity of a shareholders' agreement in the
non-close corporation situation would depend upon the court's
view of previous case law. 9 However, it can be argued that the
implications of sections 300(b) and 706(a) require that validity
extend only to the close corporation setting. A statutory con-
struction argument, based on the proposition that the legisla-
ture could have made a provision for the validity of sharehold-
ers' agreements in the non-close corporation setting but failed
to do so because that result was not desired, leads to a conclu-
sion that previous case law has been superseded by legislation
that validated shareholder agreements only for close corpora-
tions.
52. Id. § 300(c).
53. Id. § 158.
54. Id. § 1111.
55. Id. § 1201(e).
56. Section 706(a) provides in pertinent part: "An agreement made pursuant to
this subdivision between shareholders of a close corporation shall terminate when the
corporation ceases to be a close corporation. ... (emphasis added). Id. § 706(a).
57. Id. §§ 300(b), 706(a).
58. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.




Currently all states, except Delaware, have statutes that
regulate the issuance of corporate securities.A0 These statutes
vary in coverage and approach; some have very stringent provi-
sions, while others have provisions that are more lenientA1 In
California, regulation of securities takes the form of qualifica-
tion."2 Under this method, the issuer is required to file certain
documents with the Corporations Commissioner (hereinafter
Commissioner). These documents detail who is involved
with the offer, the value of the assets standing behind the offer,
and the specifics of any contractual agreement that might
affect the proposed offer.1
3
The purpose of the qualification procedure is to prevent
the issuance of securities by unscrupulous or incompetent pro-
moters." It is recognized, however, that certain issuances need
not be subjected to extensive review. As a result, California has
attempted to harmonize the desire to prevent the perpetration
of frauds with the desire to provide for expeditious yet ade-
quate qualification procedures by formulating three qualifica-
tion methods-coordination, notification, and permit. 5
60. W. CAREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1477 (4th ed. unabr. 1969);
Hayes, State Regulation of Securities Issues, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 170 (1967).
61. The various statutory schemes are generally classified as being either by: (1)
registration of the securities; (2) registration of those who deal in securities; or (3)
statutory provisions that provide that engaging in certain specified practices is
grounds for criminal prosecution, suspension of trading, or both. For a summary of
the broad range of regulations involved with each type of scheme, see W. CAREY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1478-80 (4th ed. unabr. 1969); Hoffman, Blue Skying
an Issue, 13 How. L. J. 108, 108-18 (1967).
62. Qualification of securities in California involves one of three procedures: (1)
Qualification by Coordination, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111 (West 1977); (2) Qualification
by Notification, id. § 25112; or (3) Qualification by Permit, id. § 25113. For an explana-
tion of these procedures, see notes 66-85 and accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 66-85 and accompanying text infra.
64. 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 433 (R. Clark
ed. 1977); E. GIACOMINI, J. HARGROVE & W. SMALL, ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS IN
CALIFORNIA 172 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GIACOMINII; see also People v. Syde, 37 Cal.
2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951); In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 151-52, 73 P.2d 885,
887 (1937); In re Leach, 251 Cal. 536, 543, 12 P.2d 3, 6 (1932).
One author notes that the California statutes actually go beyond merely protecting
investors from sales fraud because they also attempt to regulate the organization and
structure of businesses. See Hoisington, Condominiums and the Corporate Securities
Law, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 243 (1963).
65. See 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS
§ 6.01(2)(a) (1976) [hereinafter cited as MARSH & VOLKI; Olsen, The California Corpo-
rate Securities Law of 1968, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 75, 92 (1968).
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Qualification by Coordination
Qualification by coordination is available when a registra-
tion statement has been filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under the Securities Act of 1933.1" The ap-
plicant files the necessary papers with the SEC; then, before
five business days have elapsed, he files the same papers
with the Department of Corporations. 7 The applicant then
files statements of maximum and minimum offering prices,
underwriting discounts, and commissions." After the applica-
tion has been on file for at least ten calendar days, and assum-
ing that no stop order is issued by the Commissioner, the appli-
cation becomes effective when the federal registration state-
ment is declared operative. 9 The applicant must also comply
with certain "post-effective" procedures in order to maintain
the qualification's effectiveness. Basically this means that the
applicant must promptly notify the Commissioner of the date
and time at which the federal registration became effective,
and of the content of the final federal price amendment. 0
Qualification by Notification
This method is available only when the issuer is not eligi-
ble for qualification by coordination,7' and is either an issuer
of a security registered under section 12 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934,2 or an investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940.11 Under the notifi-
cation procedure, the applicant is required to file a form under
provisions of Title 10 of the California Administrative Code.
Section 260.111 provides that the applicant must include on
the "facing page" information concerning the name and princi-
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-77bbbb (Supp. 11971).
67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111(b) (West 1977); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.111
(1975).
68. Id.
69. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111(c) (West 1977); GIACOMINI, supra note 64, at 235;
MARSH & VOLK, supra note 65, at § 6.03[6]; J. SCHUTZHANK & J. ANDREWS, CALIFORNIA
SECURITIES LAW ANALYSIS 61 (1968).
70. Failure to comply with these post-effective procedures can have severe conse-
quences. Since the Commissioner can void the qualification retroactively, it is possible
that the issuer who fails to comply may find all sales of the affected securities illegal.
If this were to happen, the purchasers could sue for a rescission under CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 25503 (West 1977), and the issuer could be subjected to criminal prosecution under
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540 (West 1977). MARSH & VOLK, supra note 65, at § 6.03[71.
71. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25112(a) (West 1977).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (Supp. 11971).
73. Id. §§ 80a-1-80b-21.
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pal business address of the applicant, title and amount of se-
curities being qualified, proposed maximum offering price or
nature of the consideration if other than cash, and whether the
application is for an open or limited offering qualification."
After the "facing page" is completed, the applicant is di-
rected to include information about the type of business en-
gaged in, the purpose for which the proceeds from the sale are
to be applied and the method of distribution, and any previous
issuance of securities." The qualification will become automat-
ically effective at twelve noon, ten business days after the com-
pletion of filing, provided the Commissioner does not issue a
stop order."
Qualification by Permit
The third method of qualification is by permit." This
method is available to issuers who fail to meet the require-
ments of the other methods, 8 or to issuers attempting a reorg-
anization under Corporations Code section 25120.11 Due to the
restrictions on the use of the first two procedures, qualification
by permit is by far the most frequently used method" and
would seem to be the only method available to the average
close corporation.
Qualification by permit requires that the applicant file the
same form required by the notification method.8 ' In addition,
the applicant must include information related to previously
granted exemptions under Corporations Code section 25102(h),
the value of oil, gas, or mining leases held by the applicant, real
estate syndicates, mutual water companies, and churches, as
well as exhibits of the corporation's articles, certificate of incor-
poration, financial statements made pursuant to section
260.613 of Title 10 of the Administrative Code, and a list of
names of the proposed purchasers or an identification of the
class of proposed offerees.8 1
Under this method, qualification becomes effective only
upon the issuance of the permit by the Commissioner. Thus,
74. See text accompanying notes 88-93 infra.
75. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.112 (1975).
76. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25112(c) (West 1977).
77. Id. § 25113.
78. Id. § 25113(a).
79. Id. § 25121.
80. GIACOMINI, supra note 64, at 192.
81. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
82. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.113 (1975).
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the Commissioner must take some affirmative action before
the securities can be sold. 3 The Code contains no time limit
within which the Commissioner must act. However, there is a
provision that states that the applicant is entitled to a hearing
pursuant to the provisions of the California Administrative
Procedure Act when a permit is actually denied. This hearing
is to be held within twenty business days after a written request
for a hearing is submitted by the applicant. 4 Thus, it has been
argued that an applicant can force the Commissioner to grant
or deny the permit within the twenty-day period if the appli-
cant believes that an unreasonably long delay has occurred. 5
The only reported case involving the Commissioner's duty
to act within a specified period is Giannini Controls v. Superior
Court."' Although Giannini was decided before the passage of
the statute, it is illustrative of the zealous approach sometimes
taken by the Department of Corporations. Giannini was at-
tempting to effect a merger with Datex Corporation. Under the
merger proposal, Giannini was to cancel the stock it held in
Datex and exchange shares of its common stock for those Datex
shares held by the one remaining shareholder at a ratio of 1.8
to 1. Pursuant to this plan, Giannini filed an application for a
permit to issue the necessary securities. However, the minority
stockholder refused the offer and became entitled to a cash
settlement. Giannini asked the Commissioner to issue a certifi-
cate stating that no permit would be necessary since no securi-
ties were going to be issued. No action was taken by the Com-
missioner. Hearings were held six months later, but no final
pronouncement was made.
Giannini obtained an alternative writ of mandate requir-
ing the Commissioner either to grant the request, or to show
cause as to why a peremptory writ of mandate should not issue
compelling him to do so. The Commissioner demurred and a
peremptory writ was issued. The Commissioner then denied
Giannini's request. On appeal, the Commissioner's decision
was overturned, and Giannini's request granted. The petition
for a hearing before the California Supreme Court was denied,
83. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113(c) (West 1977); MARSH & VoLK, supra note 65, at §
6.05[2]. This is in contrast to the coordination and notification methods, which do
not require that the Commissioner take any action at all since qualification is automat-
ically effective once all the necessary procedures have been complied with. See text
accompanying notes 69, 76 supra.
84. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25143(b) (West 1977).
85. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 65, at §§ 2.02[4], 6.05[21.
86. 240 Cal. App. 2d 142, 49 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1966).
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and after almost eighteen months of litigation, the two corpora-
tions were allowed to conclude their merger.8"
The Standards Used in the Qualification Procedure
Open and Limited Qualifications. In order to protect the
public from unscrupulous investment schemes, the Depart-
ment of Corporations has drafted regulations establishing stan-
dards to evaluate proposed offers of securities. These standards
cover a broad range of situations and can be varied depending
on whether the applicant is seeking an open or limited qualifi-
cation.8 1 If the applicant expects to offer securities to the public
at large, an open qualification will be necessary.8' In such situa-
tions, the standards are applied strictly because the potential
for harm is quite extensive, and there is rarely any opportunity
to bargain over the terms of the offer." On the other hand, the
standards can be applied with greater flexibility when judging
limited offerings" because these issues can only be offered to
specifically named or specifically designated classes of people.'
In addition, these issuances often offer the purchasers the op-
portunity to negotiate the terms of the offer, and, therefore, the
potential for fraud is dramatically reduced."
The Fair, Just, and Equitable Standard. The Corporations
Code requires that a proposed offer of securities be deemed
"fair, just, and equitable."' 4 Unfortunately, there is very little
guidance as to what that standard means. Section 25140(d)
provides that the Commissioner may not issue a stop order or
refuse to issue a permit on the grounds that the price at which
87. Id. at 144-50, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
88. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140 (1977); MARSH & VOLK, supra note
65, at § 8.01[4]-[5][b].
89. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 § 260.001(d) (1975) defines open qualification as "a
qualification which authorizes the offer and sale of securities to the public generally,
without restriction as to persons or class of persons."
90. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 65, at § 8.01[51[b].
91. Id.
92. Under CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.001(e) (1975), a limited offering quali-
fication is defined as "a qualification which authorizes the offer and sale of securities
only to persons designated therein by name or class."
93. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 65, at § 8.01r5][b]. For an example of the
situations involved with these kinds of issues, see id.
94. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(a) (West 1977) provides that the Commissioner may
issue a stop order denying effectiveness to, or revoking the effectiveness of, any qualifi-
cation issued pursuant to section 25111 or 25112 in any case where it is found that the
proposed issuance or sale of securities is not fair, just, or equitable. Similarly, CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25140(b) (West 1977) provides that the Commissioner may refuse to issue
a permit under section 25113 unless he finds the proposed issuance to be fair, just and
equitable.
1979]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the security is offered is "unfair, unjust, or inequitable." 5 The
section is applicable only when the security is being publicly
offered for cash pursuant to a registration statement under the
Securities Act of 1933,"1 and is the subject of a firm commit-
ment underwriting by an underwriter, or syndicate of under-
writers registered under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.91 Beyond this, there are extensive guidelines that detail
the appropriate criteria for interpretation of the "fair, just, and
equitable" standard.98 However, instead of explaining what the
phrase means in general terms, these rules look at certain spe-
cific provisions of theoretical issuances and dictate what is
acceptable.
Otherwise, there is very little legislative or judicial guid-
ance as to what "fair, just, and equitable" means. According
to one commentator, this lack of statutory definition should be
understandable as "the problem of the appropriate limitation
of the discretion of an administrative agency is virtually insolu-
able. Too limited discretion in the hands of the right adminis-
trator can bring about as much public harm as can the broad-
est discretion in the hands of the wrong administrator.""
An understanding of the importance of shareholders'
agreements to the close corporation and an appreciation of the
needless burden qualification procedures placed on the close
corporation assist in the analysis and critique of California's
securities qualification laws.
THE COMMISSIONER'S REGULATIONS
Offers or Sales of Securities
Under Corporations Code section 25110, it is necessary to
qualify securities before they can be offered or sold. The Legis-
lature has exempted close corporations from this general re-
quirement if, among other things, there will only be one class
of stock outstanding after the proposed transaction is com-
pleted. 00 This exemption will be denied to the vast majority of
95. It has also been noted that the application of the fair, just, and equitable
standard is limited by the fact that the Commissioner has the burden of establishing
the fact that the offer is unfair, unjust, or inequitable. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 65,
at § 8.01(1).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (Supp. 11971).
97. Id. at §§ 78-78hh-1.
98. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, §§ 260.100-106.26, 260.140.1-.7 (1975).
99. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 65, at § 8.01(3). In referring to the problem as
being "unsoluable," the authors are probably stating that it is unsolvable.
100. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (West 1977). For an explanation of this exemption,
see note 6 and accompanying text supra. For a detailed analysis of those transactions
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close corporations under new section 260.102.4(b) of Title 10 of
the California Administrative Code because it provides:
A corporation does not have 'only one class of stock'
outstanding if, at the time its sbares are issued, there ex-
ists or is presently intended to be executed a shareholders'
agreement pursuant to which any of the rights, prefer-
ences, privileges, or restrictions upon its shares, as enu-
merated in subdivision (e) of section 25103 of the Code, are
or would be modified as to any such shares, or as to the
holders of such shares, in a manner not applicable to all
outstanding shares. 10
This regulation will clearly have a broad effect on Califor-
nia's close corporations since shareholder agreements must, in
order to guarantee shareholder control of management and
decision-making, affect the rights and privileges associated
with stock ownership. This is clearly so with agreements that
control the choice of directors and the distribution of dividends
since Corporations Code subsections 25103(e)(2) and (7) specif-
ically mention these rights. As to the other areas affected by
shareholder agreements, the relation may not be so clear.
However, since it will be left to the Department of Corporations
to decide whether or not a shareholders' agreement affects
changes in the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of
or on an issuer's stock, qualification will be required in the vast
majority of cases.
Conversions
The securities qualification laws also anticipate that some
non-close corporations will find it advantageous to convert to
close-corporate status. Normally such a change in a corpora-
tion's status would force the enterprise to qualify its outstand-
ing securities. 02 However, under Corporations Code section
25103(e), changes in the rights, preferences, privileges, or re-
exempted from the qualification procedures of CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110, see MARSH &
VOLK, supra note 65, at §§ 4.01-.09.
101. See note 5 supra.
102. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25120 (West 1977) provides:
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell in this state any security in
an issuer transaction in connection with any change in the rights, prefer-
ences, privileges, or restrictions of or on outstanding securities or in any
exchange of securities by the issuer with its existing security holders
exclusively or in any exchange in connection with any merger or consoli-
dation or purchase of corporate assets in consideration wholly or in part
of the issuance of securities, unless the security is qualified . . ..
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strictions of or on outstanding shares do not materially or ad-
versely affect any class of shareholders if they arise from the
conversion of an existing corporation to a close corporation.103
Unfortunately, this exemption is unavailable where a share-
holders' agreement exists that provides for significant manage-
ment controls, because Corporations Code subsections
25103(e)(2) and (7) provide that changes in dividend or voting
rights can materially and adversely affect shareholders. The
only other alternative exemption is probably not applicable to
the typical close corporation, as it applies only when less than
25% of the affected securities are owned by persons having
California addresses. 1 4
THE IMPACT OF THE SECURITIES QUALIFICATION LAW
To illustrate the potential impact of the securities qualifi-
cation laws, a representative selection of hypothetical situa-
tions will be examined.
Initial Organizations
Many of the problems created by these qualification laws
will occur with the initial organization of the enterprise as a
close corporation. Suppose, for example, that four individuals
having extensive training in electrical engineering decide to
organize a small firm that manufactures electrical components.
The parties have noted, however, that only A and B have suffi-
cient funds to provide for the financing of the enterprise. As a
result, the four agree that A and B will be allowed to protect
their investment by rights that guarantee them a preference in
the distribution of corporate earnings. The parties then deter-
mine that the enterprise should be incorporated as a close cor-
poration. This will insure the validity of the agreement that
grants A and B preference in the event of a distribution of
earnings and will also allow the company to take advantage of
the close corporation exemption from the qualification require-
ments of Corporations Code section 25110. Under the new regu-
lations, the existence of this shareholders' agreement will force
the corporation to qualify any issuance of stock since the close
corporation exemption will be unavailable because the corpora-
103. 1978 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 370, at 1041.
104. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(c) (West 1977); Olsen, The California Corporate
Securities Law of 1968, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 75, 88-89 (1968).
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tion will be viewed as not having only one class of stock. 5
In a similar situation involving the initial organization of
a business, the organizers, who number less than ten, may
decide to pay into the corporate treasury certain amounts of
money to be used for the payment of incorporation expenses.
In doing so the investors intend for the payment to create an
obligation on the part of the corporation to issue stock to them.
These same shareholders, recognizing that one of their group
has the management skills necessary to operate the business,
agree that one individual is to have a veto power over the
shareholders' decisions on the election of the board members.
The business is then incorporated under the close corporation
statute with the hope that the issuance of common stock pur-
suant to this plan is not within the purview of the qualification
laws.
Under section 260.105.23 of Title 10 of the Administrative
Code, exemption from the securities qualification requirements
is appropriate in any transaction where the corporation incurs
an obligation to issue stock as consideration for money being
advanced to it for the purpose of covering incorporation costs.'"1
However, the Commissioner's regulations make such an ex-
emption inappropriate because the shareholders' agreement in
this example affects the voting rights associated with the own-
ership of stock.'0
Operational Enterprises
The regulations will also create problems for businesses
that have been in operation for some period of time. Suppose
that ABC Corporation initially organizes as a close corporation
and issues common stock that bears a legend permitting the
sale or transfer of the stocks only after the corporation has first
been offered the opportunity to repurchase it. After some
years pass, the shareholders agree to allow certain shareholders
to freely transfer their stock in the interest of creating greater
financial flexibility, on the condition that no such transfer shall
105. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.102.4(b) (1978); text accompanying note
5 supra.
106. The Corporations Commissioner has recently reviewed a situation which
would have been exactly the same as this one except for the existence of the sharehold-
ers' agreement. In that case it was noted that all of the provisions of CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 25102(h) (West 1977) had been complied with. Thus, exemption from securities
qualification was appropriate Cal. Corp. Dep't, Opinion Letter OP 77/9C (Sept. 1977).
107. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.102.4(b) (1978); text accompanying note
5 supra.
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cause the corporation to lose its close corporate status. Nor-
mally the corporation would not need to qualify the issuance
should it seek to issue additional common stock, since section
25102(h) exempts close corporation securities offers from quali-
fication requirements when there is only one class of stock.'"'
Unfortunately, the Commissioner's regulation will require the
corporation to go through the qualification process even though
these kinds of stock transfer restrictions have universally been
considered fair.'09
The regulation will have a similar effect on an existing
partnership in the event that its members decide to incorpo-
rate. One example of this might involve a business owned by
three individuals as a general partnership. Over a period of
years, the partners have seen the enterprise grow and have
decided that limited liability and corporate taxation are now
extremely advantageous. As a result, the partners agree to in-
corporate as a close corporation and transfer all partnership
assets to the corporation in exchange for 3,000 shares of com-
mon stock with each partner receiving 1,000 shares. Before the
issuance of these securities, the partners agree to continue pre-
vious partnership practices and grant one of them the sole au-
thority to determine when and if corporate assets can be leased
to third parties. Under Corporations Code section 25102(h), it
would appear that the subsequent issue of stocks pursuant to
the proposed plan is exempted from the qualification require-
ments of section 25110 since the agreement does not affect any
provision of the close corporation exemption. However, under
the amended regulations this exemption would be denied
merely because there exists a shareholders' agreement which
affects voting rights usually associated with the ownership of
stock. "0
Conversions
Corporations Code section 25103(e) will also force qualifi-
cation of outstanding securities under Corporations Code sec-
tion 25120 in the event that a non-close corporation decides to
108. Furthermore, under the regulations it is provided that the Commissioner
will not interfere with private contracts between shareholders that restrict transferabil-
ity of securities so long as the restriction does not unfairly prejudice the opportunity
of the holder to realize a reasonable price for the security. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, §
260.140.8 (1972).
109. See HENN, supra note 11, at 553-54.




convert into a statutory close corporation. Suppose that a cor-
poration was founded several years ago as a non-close corpora-
tion. At the time of incorporation there were several sharehold-
ers involved. As time progressed competitors entered the field,
the corporation's earnings declined, and many of the share-
holders sold their shares back to other shareholders.
Today the number of record and beneficial shareholders is
fewer than ten, and some of those have determined that it
would be most beneficial to keep the enterprise's plant facili-
ties and distribution system intact, and convert to the manu-
facture of a different item analyzed as having great market
potential. The proposed corporation is to be operated in a fash-
ion similar to its predecessor with some of the parties supplying
management skills and others supplying financial backing. In
order to protect their respective interests, the parties enter into
a shareholders' agreement that provides that some of the share-
holders are to be given preference in regards to dividends. After
a review of the Corporations Code, it is determined that conver-
sion to close corporation status will best suit the parties' needs
since such a structure will guarantee enforceability of the
shareholders' agreement. However, the agreement affects
rights and privileges respecting dividends, and since Corpora-
tions Code section 25103(e)(2) specifically denies exemption in
such situations, qualification will be necessary.
CRITIQUE OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
It is presumed that the securities qualification laws are
aimed at furthering the goal of protecting the public from un-
scrupulous securities offers."' Arguably, the new administra-
tive and legislative rules aid in the achievement of this goal
because they extend administrative review of securities offers
to a setting where the necessity for qualification was questiona-
ble. As such, a potentially greater number of fraudulent
schemes will be discovered, and the public will be protected
from that many more inadvisable investment opportunities.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is difficult
to see how securities offers in the close corporate setting affect
the public since the Corporations Code effectively limits the
number of potential investors to a maximum of ten."' The
logical response to this contention is that the Commissioner
111. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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has a duty to protect people and not just that larger group
known as the "public." This argument seems to lack substance
when carefully analyzed. If offers of stock which qualify for the
exemption of Corporations Code section 25102(h) are to be sub-
jected to administrative review only when there exists a share-
holders' agreement affecting the rights associated with the
ownership of those securities, it must be due to the fact that
the agreement alone creates the possibility of the offer being
fraudulent. However, since Corporations Code section 186 re-
quires that all shareholders participate in such agreements be-
fore they can benefit from the enforcement sanctions of Code
sections 300(b) and 706(a), it would clearly be necessary for all
purchasers to be advised of the agreement. As such, all pur-
chasers would be afforded the opportunity to effectively evalu-
ate the offer without the benefit of the Corporations Depart-
ment's input."'
Beyond extending the burdens of qualification to close cor-
porations, the regulations will also diminish the attractiveness
of incorporating as a close corporation in order to assure protec-
tion for the viability of shareholders' agreements. As a result,
the number of close corporations will decrease as organizers,
due to their reluctance to limit the available pool of potential
investors to a maximum of ten,"' will incorporate as a general
corporation and revert to the old practice of hoping that man-
agement controls will be judicially respected. Similarly, those
close corporations presently existing will also find their status
detrimental as they will have to be sure that current share-
holder agreements do not affect stock ownership rights if they
ever decide to seek additional capital through the issuance of
more common stock.
113. Indeed, interaction between shareholders in a setting where they are few in
number is considered to be the normal and expected mode of operation. Jordan, supra
note 3, at 1094 n.1.
114. The primary source of capital for small closely-held businesses comes from
the personal savings of the organizers and the earnings of the business. Other sources
of capital, such as earnings realized from public offerings of stock, play only a minor
role in financing such firms. D. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS
FINANCE 575-76 (3rd ed. 1966). This being the case, it would seem that the ability to
gather funds from a large group would be advantageous since most individuals have
only a limited amount of savings. In fact, one commonly cited advantage of incorpora-
tion is that corporate structure allows for the possibility of aggregating large sums of
capital. J. BONNEVILLE, L. DEWEY & H. KELLY, ORGANIZING AND FINANCING BUSINESS 70
(6th ed. 1959).
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CONCLUSION
The end result of California's securities laws will be a rein-
statement of the situation where shareholders could only hope
that the courts would respect and enforce their agreements-a
situation which the Legislature viewed as being worthy of re-
form in 1976."' As such, these laws not only extend the burdens
of qualification to the close corporation, but thwart the pre-
viously expressed intent of the Legislature as well.
Marc H. Cochran
115. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.

